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Concentration de l'actionnariat et discipline de marché dans le secteur bancaire 
en Europe 
Résumé 
Nous évaluons l’effet de la concentration de l’actionnariat sur la discipline de marché 
exercée par les actionnaires des grandes banques européennes cotées. Plus précisément, 
nous testons tout d’abord dans quelle mesure le pouvoir prédictif de la distance au défaut 
est affecté par le degré de concentration de l’actionnariat (versant « monitoring » de la 
discipline de marché). Nous regardons ensuite si la situation financière future est 
directement influencée par la concentration actionnariale (versant « influence » de la 
discipline de marché). Nos estimations sont conduites sur un panel de 77 banques 
européennes cotées, observées entre début 1997 et fin 2005. Nous trouvons que la 
dispersion de la propriété réduit le pouvoir prédictif de la distance au défaut, et que la 
concentration de l’actionnariat est corrélée à une augmentation de la probabilité future 
de détresse financière. Les données utilisées proviennent de trois sources : Bankscope, 
Datastream et Thomson One Banker Ownership. Nous employons des modèles logit 
empilés avec correction des effets de clustering, et nous testons différentes mesures de la 
concentration actionnariale. Nous rappelons aussi les résultats théoriques qui prédisent 
que la discipline de marché doit être altérée par la concentration de l’actionnariat. Ce 
travail suggère en fait que la littérature empirique traitant des déterminants de 
l’efficacité de la discipline de marché ne devrait pas uniquement se focaliser sur l’aléa 
moral potentiellement créé par l’assurance dépôts, l’opacité des bilans ou le filet de 
sécurité prudentiel : l’évolution de la structure de propriété des banques doit aussi être 
un sujet d’attention pour les autorités prudentielles. 
Mots-clés : discipline de marché ; concentration de la propriété ; risques bancaires 
 
Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking: Good 
monitoring but bad influence? 
Abstract 
We investigate the impact of banks’ ownership concentration on the effectiveness of 
shareholders’ market discipline. More precisely, we first assess whether the ability of the 
distance to default to predict banks’ financial distress is affected by the level of ownership 
concentration (“monitoring” hypothesis). We also assess whether banks’ future financial 
situation is directly affected by ownership concentration (“influence” hypothesis). Our 
econometric estimates are conducted on a panel of 77 European banks observed between 
the first quarter of 1997 and the last quarter of 2005. We find that ownership dispersion 
reduces the predictive power of the distance to default. The data collected come from three 
sources: Bankscope, Datastream and Thomson One Banker Ownership. The econometric 
methodology is based on simple pooled-logit estimates corrected for the clustering effect. 
Several tests are then conducted to assess the robustness of the results. We also recall that 
theoretical results do exist to explain why banks’ ownership structure can alter market 
discipline and the ability of market-derived indicators to predict future financial 
distresses. This work finally suggests that the empirical literature dealing with market 
discipline should not focus only on the moral hazard potentially created by bad insurance 
deposit design, balance sheet opacity or the safety net: the evolution of banks ownership 
structure might also be an important prudential issue.  
Keywords: market discipline; ownership concentration; banks’ risk taking 
JEL : G21 ; G32 ; G34 ; E44 ; E58 Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
 - 3 - 
1. Introduction
1 
Market discipline and the ability of market-derived indicators to predict banks’ financial 
distress are important issues for prudential supervision (BIS 2003, Borio and alii 2004, Pop 
2007). Indeed, the use of market signals to evaluate banks’ risk profiles has, in theory, many 
advantages. For instance, share and debt prices are high frequency and forward looking 
indicators. On the contrary, accounting indicators and public or private ratings are mainly 
backward-looking and published at a much lower frequency. Market-based indicators are also 
much less costly than the qualitative assessments produced by supervisors when they 
implement in site monitoring actions.  
Nevertheless, it is necessary to recall that market discipline is a reliable support for 
banking supervision only if at list two conditions are plainly fulfilled (Bliss and Flannery 
2002): 1) firstly (“monitoring” hypothesis), share- and debtholders must be able to monitor 
banks efficiently, and their assessments must be rapidly transmitted into banks’ assets prices; 
2) secondly (“influence and feedback” hypothesis), banks’ managers are to correct their 
strategies in reaction to market signals and there must be a feedback into banks’ assets prices. 
Unfortunately, the first hypothesis challenges the modern theory of banking: if banks had no 
private information about the risk levels of their borrowers, there would be no economic 
rationale for their existence. In a world of asymmetric information, banks have a comparative 
advantage in gathering and processing information (Freixas and Rochet, 1999). Without a 
certain amount of opacity between investors and borrowers, only direct market financing 
would be economically efficient. This argument limits the scope of market discipline and 
suggests that the relevant information about banks’ assets is not fully captured by their shares 
and bonds prices. Consequently, market derived indicators are to be considered as 
complement rather than substitutes to other indicators such as ratings, accounting variables 
and qualitative information produced by in site monitoring.  
These two necessary conditions for an effective market discipline are also highly 
questionable if we think of the lessons we can retain from the theories of ownership structure. 
Indeed, there is no clear consensus about the type of ownership structure which is more prone 
to align shareholders, debtholders, supervisors and banks’ managers’ incentives. There is 
consequently an intense debate on the influence of ownership structures on the quality of 
market signals. Some argue that a certain amount of ownership concentration in the hands of 
insiders may be the best way to obtain interests convergence (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Others show that market discipline is improved by dispersed ownership 
structures (Fama, 1980), while Shleifer and Vishny (1986) demonstrate that discipline is more 
effective when ownership is concentrated in the hands of an outsider. More recently, 
Holmström and Tirole (1993) and Tirole (2006) explain that the quality of market signals as 
prospective information is improved by the active monitoring of big shareholders. Others 
point that dispersed ownership combined with good shareholder protection laws is the best 
way to avoid shareholders expropriation by managers, whereas ownership concentration is the 
best structure in country with poor shareholder protection (La Porta and alii, 2002).  
                                                 
1 Frédérik Ducrozet and Adrian Roche (Crédit Agricole SA, Paris) have provided us with very helpful research 
assistance on collecting Bankscope and Datastream data and computing the distances to default. Sophie Cancel 
(LEREPS, Toulouse University) has provided similar help on collecting Thomson One Banker ownership data. 
Preliminary results on the predictive power of our distances to default can be found in Brossard, Ducrozet and 
Roche 2007. 
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This problem is even more complex in the case of banking because of the possible 
supplementary conflict between shareholders and regulators (Park 1997). Indeed, Park and 
Peristiani (2007) have clearly demonstrated that banks’ shareholders may become enemies of 
regulators because of the trade-off between the charter value and the option value. When the 
charter value outweighs the option value, shareholders and regulators incentives are aligned. 
The former do not whish to augment excessively the risk level. Consequently, the price signal 
is not misleading for regulators because the bank’s share price is decreasing in the risk level. 
On the contrary, when the option value outweighs the charter value, the share price is 
increasing with risk taking and this market signal is misleading for the regulator. It is thus of 
primary importance to uncover what kind of phenomena can contribute to blur the accuracy of 
market signals. 
Empirical researches focused on the determinants of the accuracy of market signals 
have already given some valuable answers but very few, to our knowledge, have taken into 
account the possible impact of banks’ ownership structure.  
Some studies have show that the predictive power of subordinated debt spreads can be 
lowered by the existence of a safety net, by explicit public guarantees, by government 
ownership or by badly designed insurance deposit (Sironi 2003, Imaï 2006, Gropp and alii 
2006, Pop 2007). Similarly, Nier and Baumann (2006) find that capital buffers are higher 
when the government safety net is weaker, when uninsured liabilities are important in banks’ 
balance sheets and when they have a good information disclosure policy. Gropp and alii 
(2006) also find that subordinated bond spreads tend to lose their predictive power far away 
from the default date. Finally, all these studies suggest that many of the factors reinforcing 
charter value also contribute to weaken debtholders market discipline.  
The evidence is different a regards the predictive power of indicators derived from share 
prices. Gropp and alii 2006 find that the predictive power of the distance to default is not 
blurred by public support. Distinguin and alii (2006) even found that share prices signals are 
more accurate for bigger banks. This is empirically and theoretically explained by Park and 
Peristiani 2007 who show that banks’ size and their core deposits base increase their charter 
value and, consequently, reinforce the accuracy of share prices signals. 
The confrontation of these two kinds of empirical results, concerning market discipline 
by debtholders or by shareholders, suggests using debt-based indicators for the supervision of 
banks with low charter value close to the default, while indicators derived from share prices 
should rather be used far from the default and for banks with higher charter value. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of shareholders market discipline is influenced by the 
ownership structure. As a consequence, the relevance of share price-derived signals will 
certainly depend on such parameters as ownership concentration, insiders’ holdings, stability 
of the corporate ownership and nature of the most important shareholders. 
Indeed, some empirical studies have found that insider ownership influences banks’ 
risks and performances (Anderson and Fraser 2000, Spong and Sullivan 2007). Berger and 
alii  (2000) also found that the proportion of shares held by institutional investors has a 
significant impact on banks’ abnormal returns. Most interestingly, Caprio and alii (2007) 
study a panel of 244 banks across 44 countries and show that banks’ valuation is positively 
influenced by the concentration of cash flow rights and, to a lesser extend, by the 
concentration of control rights. These studies suggest that the second side of market 
discipline, the “influence and feedback” one, may work better when ownership is rather 
concentrated.  Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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Surprisingly, no empirical study of which we are aware has dealt with the influence of 
banks’ ownership structure on the other side of market discipline, the “monitoring” effect. 
Nevertheless, it is important to check whether some ownership structures deteriorate or, on 
the contrary, improve the quality of share price signals. The theoretical prediction here is 
rather controversial since some authors argue that concentrated ownership improves the 
quality of this signal (Shleifer and Vishny 1986) while others have argued that dispersed 
ownership produces better market information (Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983). 
In this paper, we propose a test of the predictive power of the distance to default similar 
to Gropp and alii (2006), but we design it so that we can take into account the influence of 
banks’ ownership concentration. We find that the direct effect of ownership concentration is 
to augment the probability of financial distress but that, at the same time, the predictive power 
of the distance to default exists only for the banks with a high level of ownership 
concentration
2. Our interpretation is that blockholders may favour risk taking (a negative 
effect of the “influence” side of market discipline) but, at the same time, allow a better 
prediction of these risks by the stock market (reinforcement of the “monitoring” effect). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we discuss the 
theoretical predictions as regards the influence of ownership structure on shareholders’ market 
discipline. Section 3 describes our database, the variables and the empirical methodology. The 
empirical results are discussed in section 4, and section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Ownership structure and market discipline 
Many theoretical and empirical works show that the liability structure is the main 
determinant of market discipline. An effective supervision by market agents may rely on the 
capital structure (Harris and Raviv, 1991), the debt structure, and the equity structure (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). These three kinds of structures cause different patterns of information 
diffusion. Therefore, market discipline can be exercised in various ways on the basis of these 
market signals. Here, we focus on the equity structure in order to assess the effectiveness of 
the market discipline exercised by a particular kind of security holders, the shareowners. 
From the regulator’s point of view, the main issue is to know whether shareholders are 
able to impose strong constraints on banks when they pursue too risky strategies. Bliss and 
Flannery (2002) explain that this matter raises two questions about market discipline. On the 
one hand, it is a necessary condition that market monitoring transmits accurate information 
about banks’ risk strategies into share prices (The “monitoring effect” of market discipline). 
On the other, this monitoring should induce managers to correct their faults. Hence, an 
“influence” effect may be added to the monitoring effect if one whishes to rely fully on the 
market to discipline banks’ managers.  
Concerning the first aspect of market discipline, Park and Peristiani (2007) show that 
share prices are not always relevant signals. When shareholders have a preference for charter 
value, and therefore a greater risk aversion, market prices are good proxies to evaluate banks’ 
risks. Nevertheless, when shareholders have a preference for the option value, the stock price 
is increasing with the bank’s risk. Consequently, it may not be relevant on its own, and 
indicators mixing it with risk measures are to be preferred. That is why we chose in section 3 
                                                 
2 In our sample, 44% of banks are “widely held”, that is to say do not have any shareholder owning more than 
10% of the outstanding shares. Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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to implement the test of shareholders’ market discipline using the distance-to-default rather 
than an indicator more directly derived from share prices. 
Several studies about shareholders’ market discipline in the banking sector try to assess 
shareowners “influence”, that is, the effect of monitoring on risk-taking. Moreover, they 
analyze the effects of ownership structures in the Jensen and Meckling tradition, emphasizing 
the difference between insiders ownership and outsiders ownership. This distinction has 
produced many insights to understand the effect of shareholding structures on banks’ risk 
profiles. For instance, Anderson and Fraser (2000) find that managerial shareholdings are an 
important determinant of bank’s risk-taking. During the late eighties, while the US banking 
industry was very competitive, managerial equity holding caused more risk taking because the 
charter value was low. But at the beginning of the nineties, while regulations tended to 
augment charter value, managerial equity holding reduced incentives for risk taking. This 
evidence shows clearly that the Jensen and Meckling “convergence-of-interest” hypothesis 
plays an important role in the understanding of bank’s risk-taking strategy. Sullivan and 
Spong (2007) found a very similar result for US banks at the beginning of the nineties. Their 
main finding was that this decreasing risk effect is reinforced by the relative concentration of 
insider equities in managers’ portfolios. Likewise, they show that an increasing relative 
weight of the bank’s shares in the portfolio of an outside monitor contributes to the risk 
decrease. The importance of the effect of managerial shareholding on bank strategies is also 
corroborated in the case of European commercial banks (Barry, 2007). For a sample of listed 
and non-listed banks, Barry (2007) shows that bank risk taking is increasing with managerial 
equity holding. Nevertheless, in this study, ownership concentration is not significant, which 
is mainly due to the sample homogeneity in terms of ownership structure.  
This literature on bank ownership structure is focused on the “influence effect” of 
market discipline. Unfortunately, it is not directly focused on the predictive power of market 
monitoring itself. Moreover, it concerns only one aspect of corporate governance, namely the 
insider-outsider shareholding structure. In this respect, it could be fertile to use other insights 
of corporate governance theories. Indeed, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) explain in a 
convincing way that the fraction of shares owned by insiders does not reflect the same 
interests when they are held by professional managers or by a board member who represents 
an important shareholder of the company. Likewise, Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005) and 
Aglietta (2007) present various forms of control differentiated by the investors’ type, and not 
only by the insider-outsider distinction. Berger and al. (2000) do not find any effect of insider 
ownership on abnormal returns, but they show that the latter are rather influenced by the 
presence of institutional investors, that is to say by the investors’ type.  
Therefore, we think more relevant to focus on the shareholdings of the largest owners, 
which constitute a more representative indicator of the ability of shareholders to effectively 
monitor management. According to this line of thinking, and besides the classical insider-
outsider distinction, an important theoretical literature has highlighted that concentrated or 
dispersed ownership structures can produce various monitoring patterns. These theories could 
be very helpful to understand what kind of shareholding structure can improve the quality of 
shareholders monitoring and, consequently, enhance the predictive power of stock prices. In 
their study of banks’ corporate governance, Caprio and al. (2007) use the dispersion-
concentration distinction but rather to assess the influence effect than the monitoring one. 
Likewise, Iannotta and al. (2007) directly assess the effect of ownership concentration on 
bank risk taking rather than the monitoring side of market discipline. The challenge here is to Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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use these theories in order to evaluate not only the influence but also the monitoring effect in 
European banks. Let us present succinctly these approaches
3. 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983), argue that a “widely held” firm is an 
efficient shareholder structure because it permits an ex post adjustment of securities prices on 
the basis of the past managerial performance. The main idea is that the more investors’ 
portfolios are diversified, the more shareholder structures are dispersed, and the more 
financial markets are efficient. It is because of the risk dispersion between shareholders that 
the market generates accurate signals, and ensures a good monitoring.  
Grossman and Hart (1980) develop a contrarian hypothesis: in a situation of capital 
dispersion, and if market discipline is reflected in the securities price, a free rider problem 
exists and may inhibit takeovers. Then, the threat of the loss of control has no influence and 
cannot discipline management. It hence reduces the research of information by investors and 
the informational content of stock prices.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) overcome this free rider problem by showing the 
importance of big shareholders in the monitoring activity. Because they own a substantial 
share of equities, these shareowners can support the cost of monitoring. Thus, they can diffuse 
an accurate signal to the market and thereby facilitate the occurrence of a takeover. There is 
no free rider problem when a big shareholder exists. In that case, ex ante monitoring and its 
influence effect on management are effective.  
Holmström and Tirole (1993) explain in an integrative framework the costs and benefits 
of each kind of ownership structure. First, ownership dispersion permits to increase exchanges 
on companies’ securities. The subsequent increase in liquidity allows “speculative investors” 
with private information about the firm to hide buying or selling activities behind the active 
trading on corporate securities. Hence, the more the market is liquid, the more private 
information is valuable. Ownership dispersion is therefore an incentive to collect private 
information about past managerial behavior in order to assess its effect on assets’ value. This 
monitoring enhancement improves the informational content of prices about past events. This 
monitoring is a “passive” one insofar as it relies on backward looking information and does 
not imply any interference with managerial team or board members (Tirole, 2006).  
Nevertheless, this kind of passive monitoring has a cost for some investors who are not 
well informed (Holmström and Tirole, 1993). Indeed, their loss is the counterpart of the gain 
of speculative shareholders. Because the market anticipates this potential cost, investors 
would minimize the value of securities when the corporation issues them. Then, it could be 
optimal to maintain a certain level of concentration. But, more than anything, the benefits 
from ownership concentration arise from the high-powered influence effects that can be 
implemented thanks to control rights (Tirole, 2006). That is why big shareholders can 
interfere with the board decisions. Thereby, ownership concentration is associated with the 
research of prospective information about managerial or board strategies. Shareowners then 
collect forward-looking information in order to alter the course of action of the firm, 
especially if the board pursues strategies against their interests. By this active monitoring, and 
their capacity to interfere with the firm, big shareholders transmit accurate signals to the 
market.  
                                                 
3 This survey is focused on dispersed-concentrated ownership models. Other theories like the ones of Morin 
(1996, 2000) mix in an integrative framework the two main dimensions of ownership, namely the 
insider/outsider control and the dispersed/concentrated ownership patterns.  Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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In short, passive monitoring linked to ownership dispersion has low-powered influence 
effects insofar as the market price on the secondary market does not constraint firms in their 
capacity to secure their funding (Tirole, 2006). Nonetheless, this market price correctly 
assesses the effect of past managerial behavior on the firm’s assets and can serve as a basis for 
incentive payment schemes. But it does not have the same efficacy as an active monitoring. 
Because the latter relies on forward looking information, it has more predictive properties, 
and all the more when it is associated with potential interference associated with voting rights.  
In summary, ownership concentration is the condition for an efficient active monitoring. 
On the one hand a big shareholder may be the pivot actor during a takeover and can support 
the monitoring costs (Shleifer and Vischny, 1986; Holmström and Tirole, 1993), overcoming 
therein a free rider problem. The power of this threat ensures the quality of the monitoring 
and the effectiveness of its influence on managerial behavior. On the other hand, ownership 
concentration may convey control rights that provide strong incentives to carry out an 
accurate active monitoring (Tirole, 2006).  
All in all, corporate governance theories forecast that ownership concentration should 
improve the predictive power of monitoring inasmuch as it goes with a strong influence or 
control effect. They do not say if this leads to an increasing or a decreasing risk. This point 
depends on shareholders’ preferences for option or charter value. All these insights are 
summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 1 – Ownership concentration and the chanels of market discipline 
Ownership 
structure  Dispersed Concentrated 
Monitoring  Passive 
Monitoring  Active Monitoring 
Information type  Backward looking 






















Accuracy of the 
market price to 
reveal risk taking 
Low Strong  Strong 
 
These theoretical insights allow us to formulate two predictions about the effectiveness 
of the two indissoluble sides of shareholders’ market discipline in the banking sector: 
Proposition 1: Ownership concentration and the monitoring effect 
Because of the active monitoring implemented by large shareholders, banks’ stock prices 
will better anticipate future financial distress when banks’ ownership is concentrated 
rather than dispersed.  Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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  Obviously, it is not the main shareholder who adjusts stocks price with information, 
because of the illiquidity of its holding. Nevertheless, he has strong incentives to collect 
information about future managerial strategies, and he modifies consequently his position in 
the ownership structure. Information is thus transmitted to the market thanks to these publicly 
known transactions. In section 3, we will test this proposition using the distance to default as a 
predictor of banks’ financial distress. 
 
 
Proposition 2: Ownership concentration and the influence effect 
The concentration of ownership should have an impact on banks’ strategies and risk taking 
because the influence (and control) power of large shareholders is then reinforced. With 
his voting rights, the monitor has more weight in the strategic choice of the level of risk 
taking.  
  Not only large shareholders can convey information to the market, but they can also 
directly influence managerial strategies according to their preferences. This is not to say that 
risk taking is systematically increasing or decreasing with ownership concentration since it 
depends on main shareholders’ preferences. The proposition we can test here is then a “non-
neutrality of ownership concentration hypothesis”, but we cannot predict the sign of the effect 
on risk taking. For example, in the study of Iannotta and al. (2007) on European banks, risk 
taking decreases with ownership concentration, but we know from the demonstration of Park 
and Peristiani (2007) that it could be the contrary.  
We will test this proposition 2 by assessing whether the probability of financial distress 
is directly influenced by the existence of blockholders in banks’ ownership structure. 
3. The empirical method and the dataset 
3.1. Empirical method 
Since we deal with the predictive power of indicators derived from share prices, we 
have a choice to make between several possible measures such as banks’ stock prices, returns, 
abnormal returns, and the more sophisticated distance to default (DD). As described in the 
Appendix B, the distance to default (DD) is defined as the number of standard deviations of 
the assets volatility that separate the firm from its default point, in which the value of assets 
equals the value of debt
4.We chose this indicator because, as it is demonstrated by Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes (2005), it has two advantages for assessing banks fragility. Firstly, it is 
complete , that is to say it reflects the three major determinants of default risk (Market value 
of assets, leverage and volatility of assets). Secondly, it is unbiased since it is increasing in 
the value of assets and decreasing in the leverage and the volatility of asset. We know that this 
                                                 
4 Several studies have shown that this indicator provides additional information to traditional financial ratios. 
Many are applied to the US banking system, for instance Gunther, Levonian and Moore (2001), Krainer and 
Lopez (2003), Curry, Elmer and Fissel (2004). In the European case, Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) show that 
the distance-to-default has predictive power for bank fragility up to 18 months before the “failure” event, even 
when they control for the safety net effect and include a synthetic measure of the CAMEL indicators. 
Nevertheless, Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi (2006), who also worked on European banks but with a different 
definition of the downgrade event, found that a stepwise regression procedure always conduct to prefer a stock 
price indicator (the difference between the natural logarithm of the stock price and its moving average on 261 
days) to the DD. Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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is not the case for indicators such as the market value of equity or the share prices because, 
when the option value outweighs the charter value, shareholders give value to risk-taking 
behaviours (Park and Peristiani 2007). 
We first estimate a pooled-logit model to predict the probability of financial distress 
with the same covariates as in Gropp and alii (2006), that is to say the DD and the CAMEL-
type score. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that we work with a different definition of the 
dependant variable (see section 3.2 below), and we observe a different period (1997-2005 
while they worked on 1991-2001). Consequently, we have a different panel of European 
banks : our sample integrates more recent data, but we also lose the 1991-1996 observations 
because the data on ownership structure we use afterwards were only available from 1997 on. 
We also loose some banks for the same reason.  
Nevertheless, we obtain a benchmark model where the DD indicator has a clear 
predictive power. We are then able to integrate several dummies and crossed variables 
capturing the effect of ownership concentration, and we can thus assess the way it affects the 
quality of the DD signal. 
3.2. Database and variables construction 
In the sample selection process, we started from a panel of 82 European banks, for 
which we could obtain accounting ratios, stock market indicators and credit ratings. We then 
had to reduce this panel to 77 banks because 5 banks could not be found in Thomson One 
Banker ownership database
5. Table 2 shows the composition of the sample as regards banks’ 
type: there are 53 commercial banks, 10 bank holding companies, 6 savings banks, 3 
investment banks & securities houses, 2 cooperative banks, 2 real estate & mortgage banks 
and 1 medium & long term credit bank 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 
The DD is computed on a monthly basis (see Appendix B) but we converted it to a 
quarterly frequency afterwards, using the mean of the monthly DDs. Concerning the 
accounting ratios which are available either on a yearly, semi-yearly or quarterly basis, we 
created quarterly observations by simply reporting the latest known value. We used the same 
method for the ratings which can be modified at any point in time. Ownership information is 
directly available at a quarterly frequency in Thomson One Banker ownership database. 
To build the benchmark model, we used two different sources: Datastream for the stock 
prices and Bankscope for the financial ratios and the Fitch/ICBA credit ratings. We 
constructed a first sub-sample of 85 banks on the basis of three criteria: (i) the commercial 
bank is a public company and the stock prices are available from Datastream, (ii) its total 
market capitalization exceeds 100 €m by the end of 2005, and (iii) it is -or used to be- rated 
by the rating agency Fitch. In practice, this last criterion of credit rating availability is the 
most restrictive since we could get only 376 credit rated banks over more than 5000 European 
commercial banks identified by Bankscope. Finally, we used a minimum threshold for the 
turnover on equity to eliminate the companies whose stocks were not sufficiently traded over 
                                                 
5 The size of our sample is similar to other studies on the ownership structure of European listed banks. For 
instance, Iannotta and al. (2007) work on a sample of 181 large European banks from which they make a 
subsample of 74 listed banks.  Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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the period
6. This lead to the suppression of 3 more banks and to the constitution of the initial 
database of 82 banks.  
Of course public companies are not representative of the entire universe of European 
banks. The firms rated by Fitch may also be bigger in average than the other banks in this 
universe
7. Therefore, we shall underline the fact that our conclusions only apply to the biggest 
European banks and the most actively traded on the stock market. 
To construct the dependant variable capturing financial distress, we use the Individual 
Ratings from the Fitch/ICBA database because it reflects the risks associated with the 
intrinsic activity of the bank, regardless of the financial profile of the holding it may be 
related to. This notation takes values ranging from A (the best rating) to E (the worst) and can 
be potentially revised at any moment. We also consider the ‘Support Rating’ from the same 
agency describing the intensity of the safety net the bank might benefit from in case of 
financial difficulties. As we will see, this rating will help us to control for Too-Big-To-Fail 
effects.  
We selected two cut-off ratings to identify the situations of financial distress: as in 
Gropp and alii (2006), the variable fragile2_c is equal to one whenever the rating falls to C or 
below, but we also test the variable fragile2_cd, which is equal to one if the rating falls to C/D 
or below. Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005) provide convincing arguments to assess the 
quality of such a rating-based indicator of bank fragility. We will see however that the results 
are quite different when we choose a threshold at C/D in state of C
8. As can be seen in Table 
3, in our sample downgrade to C or C/D or below are rare events in the period under scrutiny 
(29 downgrades to C or below; 17 downgrades to C/D or below). Moreover, some banks enter 
the sample already downgraded (11 for the cut-off C and 3 for the cut-off C/D) and we do not 
know precisely for how long they have been downgraded. In addition, severely downgraded 
banks do not drop off the sample because formal bank bankruptcies is extremely rare in 
Europe. This may lead to overestimate the predictive power of the covariates because, when 
they are used with lags in order to check whether they predict downgrade in advance, we may 
correlate the downgraded rating of date t with covariates known at a date t-n when the bank 
had already been downgraded at the same level. It is therefore necessary to drop the severely 
downgraded banks after a certain time. We do not drop the bank immediately after the 
downgrade as it is done in Gropp and alii (2006), but only after four quarters if the rating does 
not rise any more. This is imposed by the low number of downgraded banks and the necessity 
to keep a not to skewed distribution of the dependant variable
9. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 
The CAMEL-type indicator is constructed using Bankscope data. We select the most 
frequently available variable for C(apital adequacy), A(sset quality), M(anagement), and 
E(arnings). We could not use any L(iquidity) ratio because it implied the loss of two much 
observations. The variables selected and the ratios constructed are presented in Table 4
10. We 
                                                 
6 The banks whose stock was traded less than 1000 times a day in 25% of the trading days (or less) were deleted 
from the sample.  
7 In fact the 82 banks of our dataset have an average market capitalization of 15 €bn by the end of 2005 and an 
average Total of Assets of 150 €bn by the end of 2005, which are significantly higher than the averages of the 
5000 banks available in Bankscope. 
8 More details on the reasons for these different results can be found in Brossard and alii (2006). 
9 Contrary to Gropp and alii (2006) we do not drop the dates at which there is no severe downgrade event, which 
was another way to obtain an acceptable balance between the ‘0’ and the ‘1’ of the dependant variable. 
10 Please note that :  Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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then construct the same score variable as used in Gropp and alii (2006), using the same 
quartile ranking methodology which is in our opinion the best way to avoid the multi-
colinearity problems in the subsequent estimations. This score variable is labelled ‘came’. 
The construction of the DD indicator from Datastream and Bankscope data is detailed in 
Appendix B. 
We also use Fitch/ICBA support rating to construct a dummy variable dsupp which 
equals 1 if the bank is strongly supported by its supervision/governmental authorities (Table 
4). 
Finally, we merged this dataset with information on the ownership structure of banks 
taken from Thomson One Banker ownership database (TOBO). TOBO offers a huge amount 
of ownership information such as the percentage of outstanding shares held by the investors, 
investors type, country, size and identification and so on. We only exploit here the 
information about investors’ holdings to construct several measures of ownership 
concentration. These measures are presented with all the covariates in Table 4. 
The matching of the Datastream/Bankscope dataset with the TOBO dataset implies the 
loss of five more banks for which we could not retrieve enough information on the ownership 
structure. The final sample is thus made of 77 banks observed on 36 quarters, and the panel is 
unbalanced. Consequently, we have up to 1555 banks/quarters observations when we use only 
the DD and “came” explanatory variables, and up to 1453 banks/quarters observations when 
we integrate the measures of ownership concentration. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 
4. The results 
In this first section we implement several tests designed to assess the predictive power 
of our distance-to-default indicator. These tests will provide a useful first-step assessment of 
our specific distance-to-default indicator. If it proves to be robust, we will be able to use it in 
a second step for the detection of the supposed impact of banks’ ownership concentration on 
the predictive power of the DD indicator.  
We estimate separately two standard (pooled) Logit models of the form :  
{} ( ) t t t t i r r r r Y came γ dsupp ' α dddsupp ' dd α 1 Prob t t t t + + + + Φ = = β β  
where : 
-  Y is either fragile2_c or fragile2_cd; 
-  rt (t= 1, …, 8) stands for the number of lags in quarter ; 
-  dddsupprt = ddrt×dsuppr;t 
-  Φ(.) is the cumulative logistic distribution. 
Since we use panel data and pooled estimations, observations are not independent 
within banks -which can generate autocorrelation- and they are independent across banks -
                                                                                                                                                          
- Capital funds means (equity + hybrid capital + subordinated debt); 
- Return on average equity is preferred to a classic return on equity in order to minimize the volatility of this 
indicator. The average equity is calculated on a period of two years. Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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which can produce heteroskedasticity. As a consequence, the standard errors are adjusted 
using the Hubber/White/Sandwich method.  
Table 5 reports the estimations of the models with independent variables lagged 2, 3, 4, 
and 6 quarters. With this dummy-designed specification, the direct coefficient of ddrt (βt) 
represents the predictive power of DD for the non-supported banks, and the coefficient for the 
supported banks is the sum of the dddsupprt and ddrt coefficients (βt+β’t). 
Interestingly, we see that the DD has predictive power only for the supported banks 
when the cut-off rating is set to C or below (dependant variable fragile2_c). On the contrary, 
it has predictive power for all the banks up to four quarters in advance when the cut-off C/D 
or below is used (dependant = fragile2_cd). Consequently, we find again Gropp & alii’s 
safety net neutrality only for the cut-off rating at C/D or below. The non neutrality result for 
the cut-off at C is nevertheless consistent with other studies that found a “reverse too-big-to-
fail effect” whereby share price indicators keep there predictive power only for the sample of 
bigger banks (Distinguin and alii 2006). 
However, the predictive power of the DD remains very interesting since we can see that 
it is significant even though we introduced the synthetic score capturing banks performance in 
terms of capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency and earnings (variable 
camert)
11. As a consequence, we can use this benchmark model to assess the influence of 
ownership concentration on the “monitoring” side of market discipline, but we will keep on 
differentiating two models, one with the cut-off of the dependant variable at C or below and 
the other at C/D or below. Moreover, the model with fragile2_c as the dependant variable will 
be estimated only for the sub-sample of supported banks while the case with fragile2_cd will 
be estimated on the full sample. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 
We now introduce a supplementary dummy variable du10c1rt to account for the influence 
of ownership concentration on the predictive power of the DD. More precisely we 
construct a cross variable dddu10c1rt = ddrt×du10c1rt. Banks with du10c1rt = 1 are 
those for which the investor holding the most important percentage of the outstanding 
shares holds at list 10% of these shares. Consequently, he is either a minority 
blockholder or a majority owner if he holds more than 50%. The results of the 
regressions are to be interpreted with the same method as in the previous case: the 
direct coefficient of ddrt (βt) represents the predictive power of DD for the banks with 
relatively low ownership concentration, and the coefficient for the banks with relatively 
high ownership concentration is the sum of the dddu10c1rt and ddrt 
coefficients (βt+β’t). The interpretation is then straightforward (Table 6):  
-  with fragile2_c, and consequently on the sole supported banks, the predictive power of 
the DD remains significant only for the banks with high ownership concentration and 
only 2 and 3 quarters in advance;  
-  with fragile2_cd, and consequently on all the banks, the predictive power of the DD 
remains significant only for the banks with high ownership concentration, 2, 3 and 4 
quarters in advance.  
                                                 
11 Please note that we also checked whether it provides some supplementary information in comparison to the 
Fitch individual rating considered at the same time-lead. We implement the same estimations controlling for the 
Fitch individual rating observed at the time the distance-to-default is also observed. The distance-to-default 
remains fairly powerful. Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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-  Moreover, there is a significant positive effect of du10c1rt on the probability of 
downgrade to C/D or below, but only 2 quarters in advance. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 
These results are consistent with Proposition 1 predicting that a certain level of 
ownership concentration is necessary to allow shareholders’ monitoring to be correctly 
transmitted to the stock market.  
Moreover, in the case of a cut-off rating at C/D or below, there is a significant direct 
effect of ownership concentration on the probability of financial distress, but only 2 quarters 
in advance. This may suggests that the existence of blockholders modify banks’ strategies. 
This would be consistent with Proposition 2 which states that concentration also favors the 
“influence and feedback” side of market discipline. 
It is necessary to check whether these results are robust when the definition of the 
ownership concentration criteria is modified. That is why we implement two supplementary 
series of regressions.  
In the first one, we changed to 20% the threshold for the definition of first investors’ 
blockholding (du20c1rt). The “monitoring” and “influence” effects appear to be reinforced 
(Table 7):  
-  with fragile2_c, and consequently on the sole supported banks, the predictive power of 
the DD remains significant only for the banks with high ownership concentration, and 
it is now true 2, 3 and 4 quarters in advance;  
-  with fragile2_cd, and consequently on all the banks, the predictive power of the DD 
remains significant only for the banks with high ownership concentration, 2, 3 and 4 
quarters in advance; 
-  Moreover, there is a significant positive effect of du20c1rt on the probability of 
downgrade to C/D or below, which is now true 2, 3 and 4 quarters in advance. 
Here we can conclude that the monitoring and influence effects of ownership 
concentration are bigger when the first investor’s shareholdings are higher. The influence 
effect is significant only on the probability of a very severe downgrade (to C/D or below). 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 
Finally, we introduce another definition of blockholding (Table 8) excluding majority 
block holders: duminorityblockpremier10rt = 1 when the first investor’s holdings represent at 
list 10% of the outstanding shares but less than 50%. The differentiated monitoring effects are 
much less significant: in the case of a cut-off at C, the DD of the banks in the category loses 
its predictive power, except two quarters in advance. In the case of a cut-off at C/D, the DD of 
the banks in the category has no supplementary predictive power in comparison to the other 
banks. Moreover, the influence effects are no longer significant since the direct coefficients of 
duminorityblockpremier10rt are never significant.  
In an additional test not reported here, we introduced another threshold for minority 
blockholding, duminorityblockpremier20rt = 1 when the first investor’s holdings represent at 
list 20% of the outstanding shares but less than 50%. Here the results for fragile2_c are very 
similar to the case of du20c1rt described above: the differentiated monitoring effects become 
significant again. When the cut-off is at C/D, the DD of the banks in the category has no Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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supplementary predictive power in comparison to the other banks, but the influence effects 
come back since the direct coefficients of duminorityblockpremier20rt become again 
significant. 
Over-all, the impact of ownership concentration on the effectiveness of market 
discipline seems to be partly related to the existence of big blockholders. More precisely, the 
monitoring effect is always limited to the banks with highly concentrated ownership, when 
the measure of ownership concentration includes majority blockholders. Therefore, big 
blockholders, but above all majority blockholders, seem to be an important source of market 
discipline in the sense of “monitoring and influencing the stock price”.  
Big blockholders holding at list 20% of the outstanding shares also seem to be a source 
of “influence” in the sense that they modify the probability of a future downgrade to C/D or 
below. Unfortunately, on the data we have used, they seem to exert a “bad influence” leading 
to “Market indiscipline” rather than discipline.  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 8 
5. Conclusions 
We have constructed a simple early warning model of banks’ financial distress in order 
to test the impact of ownership concentration on shareholders’ market discipline. We test the 
two possible effects of market discipline, according to the distinction proposed by Bliss and 
Flannery (2002): 1) the “monitor and modify the stock prices” one; and 2) the “influence the 
decisions and strategies” one. These tests are conducted on a panel of 77 European banks 
observed between the first quarter of 1997 and the last quarter of 2005. Our database is the 
result of a matching of Datastream, Bankscope and Thomson One Banker ownership data. 
The first striking result is that a certain level of ownership concentration is necessary if 
one desires shareholders’ monitoring to be correctly transmitted into the distance-to-default 
indicator. This specificity of banks with concentrated ownership is particularly strong when 
the measure of concentration includes majority shareowners or at list big blockholders 
holding more than 20% of the outstanding shares.  
The second striking result is that banks’ ownership concentration also seems to have an 
“influence” effect in the sense that it modifies the probability of future financial distress. This 
is only true, however, when the future financial distress to be predicted is very severe 
(downgrade to C/D or below). More surprisingly, this influence is positive in our data, 
meaning that it leads to more risk taking and consequently higher failure probability. This is 
not in contradiction with ownership theories since they only predict that ownership 
concentration reinforces the monitoring and influencing powers of shareholders but not that 
this should always lead to more cautious strategies. Indeed, Park and Peristiani (2007) have 
clearly shown that shareowners may value risk taking when the option value outweighs the 
charter value. Moreover, we can hypothesize that the positive correlation between ownership 
concentration and banks risk taking is due to large shareholders preferences for more risky 
bank activities. For instance, Lepetit and al. (2008) show that European banks in the late 
nineties and the early 21th century developed new activities that imply more bank risk taking. 
The changing structure of the European banking industry toward the universal banking 
principle does not lead to a risk diversification strategy. With our results this may be 
interpreted as the consequence of the large shareholders preference for the development of 
non-interest activities.  Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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This problem of the influence effect on risk taking, according to the large shareholders’ 
preferences, is reinforced when the blockholding shareholder is a big one endowed with an 
uncontestable control. The reasons for this behavior should be studied more deeply but we 
may hypothesize that some financial conglomerates push-down their risks among companies 
that constitute the corporate group. This problem, well-known by regulators (Scialom, 1997, 
2004) cannot be altered by minority shareholders if they do not have sufficient legal rights to 
protect them, even if passive monitoring can anticipate this kind of behavior.  
Financial regulators may have to be aware that the predictive power of the distance-to-
default is weakened when banks have a dispersed ownership. And they may also have to 
consider that shareholders sometimes exert a “bad influence” leading to “market indiscipline” 
rather than market discipline. Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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Appendix A : Tables 
TABLE 2 Composition of the Sample by Country and Specialization (number of banks) 
 




















Long Term Credit 
Bank 
    
                                           
Austria             1 (1)                      1 (1) 
Belgium        3 (0)                           3 (0) 
Czech Republic  1  (1)                                1 (1) 
Denmark  2  (0)                                2 (0) 
Finland  1  (1)                                1 (1) 
France  4  (2)                                4 (2) 
Germany  4  (3)            1 (1)       1 (0)  1 (1)  7 (5) 
Greece  5  (4)                                5 (4) 
Ireland  3  (0)                                3 (0) 
Italy  10  (4)       1 (1)       2 (2)            13 (7) 
Netherlands  1  (0)  1 (0)                           2 (0) 
Norway  1  (0)       3 (0)                      4 (0) 
Poland  5  (5)                                5 (5) 
Portugal  1  (0)  1 (0)       2 (1)                 4 (1) 
Spain  8  (1)                                8 (1) 
Sweden  2  (1)       1 (0)                      3 (1) 
Switzerland  1  (0)  1 (0)                           2 (0) 
United Kingdom  4  (0)  4 (0)                 1 (0)       9 (0) 
Total  53  (22)  10 (0)  6 (2)  3 (2)  2 (2)  2 (0)  1 (1)  77 (29) 
NOTES: The definition of specialization is from Bankscope. Number of downgraded banks in parentheses.                   
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TABLE 3:Downgraded Banks             
Type of the downgrade  Downgrade to C  Downgrade to CD 
Bank     First downgrade  Duration of the downgrade 
(quarters)  First downgrade  Duration of the downgrade 
(quarters) 
Commerzbank    March 97  25  March 97  13 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank   March 97  13  March 97  13 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi  March 97  10  March 97  1 
Komercni Banka   March 97  36  March 98  28 
Oko Bank   March 97  36  Sept. 99  26 
CIC  March 97  36  March 01  20 
Banca Intesa  Dec. 97  33  Dec. 02  5 
National Bank of Greece  June 98  21  June 00  6 
Erste Bank Der OesterreichischenSparkassen  Dec. 98  29  Dec. 98  29 
Credit Lyonnais   Dec. 98  29  Dec. 01  17 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin   June 00  23  June 00  15 
Aspis Bank   Dec. 01  9  Dec. 01  9 
Banca Carige   Dec. 01  17  Dec. 02  6 
Bayerische Hypo-Vereinsbank    March 02  16  March 02  15 
Deutsche Bank   March 02  16  Dec. 02  13 
Alpha Bank   Sept. 02  12  Sept. 02  10 
Emporiki Bank Of Greece   March 04  8  March 04  8 
Banca Popolare Italiana  March 97  12     
Bank Zachodni Wbk  March 97  35     
ING Bank Slaski  March 97  27     
Banif   March 97  36     
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken   March 97  34     
Bank Ochrony Srodowiska   Sept. 98  21     
Banca Popolare di Milano  Dec. 02  11     
Capitalia   March 03  12     
Cassa di risparmio di Firenze  March 02  14     
Bank BPH   March 02  10     
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki Grupa Pekao  March 02  16     
Banco Espanol de Credito  March 03  12     
Total number of severe downgrades   29    17 
NOTES: This table shows banks downgraded by Fitch/ICBA to a rating of C or below, or to one of CD or below.  Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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TABLE 4 Description of the Variables and Expected Signs 
Variables Definition  N Mean Std. dev Min Max Expected sign 
Dependent variables   
fragile2_c  = 1 if the rating falls to C or below.  2321 0.26 0.44 0 1  
fragile2_cd  = 1 if the rating falls to CD or below.  2317 0.1 0.3 0 1  
Independent variables   
Capital ratio  Capital Funds / Liabilities %  2273 8.51 2.61 2.43 18.5 – 
Asset quality ratio  Loan Loss Provisions / Net Interest Revenue %  2273 16.59 14.83 -59.12 141.87 + 
Management ratio  Cost-to-income ratio %. It represents the overheads or costs of running the bank, the major 
element of which is salaries, as a percentage of income generated before provisions.  
2273 61.74 14.67 0.41 156.71 + 
Earnings ratio  Return on average equity (ROAE) %. This performance indicator is preferred to a classic 
return on equity to minimize its volatility. The average equity is calculated on a period of two 
years. 
2273 13.8 9.2 -64.83 75.78 – 
Capital Score  Score from 0 to 3 that is formed by adding one when the bank exceeds a quartile of the capital 
ratio. By quarter, the score is equal to 0 if this accounting ratio is inferior to the 25th percentile 
of the capital ratio. 
2273 1.49 1.12 0 3 – 
Asset quality Score  Score from 0 to 3 that is formed by subtracting one when the bank exceeds a quartile of the 
asset quality ratio. By quarter, the score is equal to 3 if this accounting ratio is inferior to the 
25th percentile of the asset quality ratio.  
2273 1.51 1.12 0 3 – 
Management Score  Score from 0 to 3 that is formed by subtracting one when the bank exceeds a quartile of the 
management ratio. By quarter, the score is equal to 3 if this accounting ratio is inferior to the 
25th percentile of the management ratio.  
2273 1.51 1.12 0 3 – 
Earnings Score  Score from 0 to 3 that is formed by adding one when the bank exceeds a quartile of the 
earnings ratio. By quarter, the score is equal to 0 if this accounting ratio is inferior to the 25th 
percentile of the earnings ratio. 
2273 1.49 1.12 0 3 – 
came  Composite index from 0 to 12 using the quartile ranking of accounting ratios in each quarter. 
The index is formed by aggregating capital score, asset quality score, management score and 
earnings score. 
2273 6.00 2.82 0 12 – 
    Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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Variables Definition  N Mean Std.dev Min Max Expected sign 
dsupp  = 1 if the bank is strongly supported by public authorities in case of financial difficulties 
(safety net). Rating by Fitch/IBCA. 
2413 0.67 0.47 0 1 Unclear 
dddtkmvvol6m  The distance-to-default indicator represents the number of standard deviations (measured in 
terms of the assets' volatility) that separate the bank from its default point (defined by Total 
Assets = Total Debt). The smaller the distance-to-default, the higher the default risk. 
2282 4.52 2.41 0.59 35.56 – 
du10c1  = 1 if the largest shareholder owns more than 10% of common shares.   2239 0.56 0.50 0 1 Unclear 
du10c3  = 1 if the sum of the three largest shareholders' holdings is more than 10% of common shares.   2239 0.79 0.41 0 1 Unclear 
du10c5  = 1 if the sum of the five largest shareholders' holdings is more than 10% of common shares.   2239 0.88 0.33 0 1 Unclear 
du20c1  = 1 if the largest shareholder owns more than 20% of common shares.   2239 0.37 0.48 0 1 Unclear 
du20c3  = 1 if the sum of the three largest shareholders' holdings is more than 20% of common shares.   2239 0.56 0.50 0 1 Unclear 
du20c5  = 1 if the sum of the five largest shareholders' holdings is more than 20% of common shares.   2239 0.61 0.49 0 1 Unclear 
duwidelyheld   = 1 if no shareholder owns more than 10% of common shares.   2239 0.44 0.50 0 1 Unclear 
duminorityblockpre
mier10 
= 1 if the first shareholder owns more than 10% of common shares and is a minority 
shareholder, that is a shareholder whose the holding is inferior to 50% of common shares.  
2239 0.37 0.48 0 1 Unclear 
duminorityblockpre
mier20 
= 1 if the first shareholder owns more than 20% of common shares and is a minority 
shareholder, that is a shareholder whose the holding is inferior to 50% of common shares.  
2239 0.18 0.39 0 1 Unclear 
dd(varname)  The product of the distance-to-default indicator and a dummy variable.             fn(dummy) 
(varname)rt  A variable at date d – t where t = 2, 3, 4 quarters.              
NOTES: accounting data are from Bankscope, ratings from Fitch/IBCA Bankscope, market data from Datastream, and ownership data from Thomson One Banker Ownership and annual 
reports. Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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Table 5 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
COEFFICIENT fragile2_c  fragile2_c fragile2_c fragile2_c fragile2_cd fragile2_cd  Fragile2_cd fragile2_cd
             
ddr2  -0.07       -0.88***     
  (0.24)       (0.21)     
dddsuppr2  -0.20       0.38    
  (0.28)       (0.33)     
dsuppr2  -0.31       -2.53*     
  (1.26)       (1.41)     
camer2  -.54***       -0.57***     
  (0.08)       (0.09)     
ddr3   -0.16      -0.92***     
   (0.25)       (0.24)    
dddsuppr3   -0.08       0.56*    
   (0.28)       (0.30)    
dsuppr3   -0.80      -3.09**     
   (1.23)       (1.37)    
camer3   -0.58***        -0.68***     
   (0.11)       (0.11)    
ddr4      -0.21      -0.82***  
     (0.32)        (0.23)   
dddsuppr4     -0.06       0.53*  
     (0.35)        (0.27)   
dsuppr4      -0.67       -2.70*  
     (1.41)        (1.41)   
camer4     -0.53***      -0.69***  
     (0.14)        (0.12)   
ddr6       0.12        -0.70*** 
       (0.24)        (0.22) 
dddsuppr6       -0.42*        0.54** 
       (0.25)        (0.26) 
dsuppr6       1.46        -1.70 
       (1.30)        (1.47) 
camer6       -0.37***        -0.58*** 
       (0.12)        (0.11) 
Constant 0.62  0.91  0.52  -1.97 2.85** 3.17**  2.52* 0.94 
 (1.15)  (1.16)  (1.34)  (1.21)  (1.15)  (1.24) (1.31) (1.26) 
Observations  1329 1323 1318  1214  1555  1552 1550 1423 
N_clust  72 72 66  64  77  76 75 73 
Observations with Y=1  60  49  37  33  45  39  33  26 
Observations with Y=1 (%)  4,51%  3,70%  2,81%  2,72%  2,89%  2,51% 2,13% 1,83% 
χ2 statistic for βt+βt’=0  2.95* 2.76* 2.62*  4.00*** 3.53* 2.93*  3.20*  1.00 
χ2 statistic for βt’=0 and αt’=0  3.90 2.94 1.56  3.15  3.68 5.10*  4.23  5.79** 
chi2 61.8  35.6  25.2  23.6  78.9  45.9 45.9 73.4 
r2_p 0.24  0.26  0.23  0.13  0.30  0.33 0.31 0.25 
Model Specification :  {} ( ) t t t t t t t t camer γ dsuppr ' α dddsuppr ' ddr α 1 Prob + + + + Φ = = β β i Y   
where rt (t= 1, …, 8) stands for the number of lags in quarter and dddsupprt = ddrt×dsupprt 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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Table 6 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
COEFFICIENT fragile2_c  fragile2_c fragile2_c fragile2_cd fragile2_cd Fragile2_cd
            
ddr2 -0.05      -0.18     
 (0.16)      (0.16)     
dddu10c1r2 -0.72**      -0.38*     
 (0.32)      (0.21)     
du10c1r2 1.42      2.41**     
 (1.17)      (1.07)     
camer2 -0.56***      -0.58***     
 (0.16)      (0.08)     
ddr3   -0.09     -0.20   
   (0.19)      (0.29)   
dddu10c1r3   -0.43*     -0.42   
   (0.24)      (0.32)   
du10c1r3   0.72      2.54*   
   (1.21)      (1.35)   
camer3   -0.55***     -0.64***   
   (0.18)      (0.09)   
ddr4     -0.10      -0.14 
     (0.21)      (0.37) 
dddu10c1r4     -0.16      -0.45 
     (0.30)      (0.39) 
du10c1r4     0.18      2.72* 
     (1.63)      (1.62) 
camer4     -0.58***     -0.68*** 
     (0.18)      (0.11) 
Constant -0.36  -0.35  -0.45  -1.03  -0.90  -1.10 
 (0.75)  (0.88)  (1.07)  (0.89)  (1.12)  (1.35) 
Observations  830 834 838 1435 1445 1453 
N_clust 45  45  45  76  75  75 
Observations with Y=1  24 22 19  40  37  34 
Observations with Y=1 (%)  2,89% 2,64% 2,27%  2,79%  2,56%  2,34% 
χ2 statistic for βt+βt’=0  5.34** 5.98***  1.73  17.03***  16.06***  19.43*** 
χ2 statistic for βt’=0 and αt’=0  5.88**  4.39 0.78 5.22*  3.81  3.48 
chi2 30.7  30.5  23.9  93.5  83.5  81.3 
r2_p 0.30  0.27  0.27  0.31  0.33  0.35 
Model Specification :  {} ( ) t t t t t t t t camer γ du10c1r ' α dddu10c1r ' ddr α 1 Prob + + + + Φ = = β β i Y   
where rt (t= 1, …, 8) indicates the number of lags in quarter and dddu10c1rt = ddrt×du10c1rt 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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Table 7 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
COEFFICIENT fragile2_c  fragile2_c fragile2_c fragile2_cd fragile2_cd fragile2_cd
            
ddr2 -0.09      -0.33     
 (0.17)      (0.20)     
dddu20c1r2 -0.67**      -0.32     
 (0.28)      (0.24)     
du20c1r2 1.31      2.72***     
 (1.04)      (0.86)     
camer2 -0.57***      -0.57***     
 (0.16)      (0.07)     
ddr3   -0.09      -0.29   
   (0.17)      (0.27)   
dddu20c1r3   -0.72***     -0.45   
   (0.20)      (0.33)   
du20c1r3   1.49      3.28***   
   (1.29)      (1.21)   
camer3   -0.56***     -0.63***   
   (0.18)      (0.08)   
ddr4     -0.04      -0.19 
     (0.16)      (0.31) 
dddu20c1r4     -0.50*      -0.56 
     (0.30)      (0.41) 
du20c1r4     0.51     3.55** 
     (2.21)      (1.59) 
camer4     -0.62***     -0.68*** 
     (0.20)      (0.10) 
Constant -0.29  -0.39  -0.48  -0.64  -0.78  -0.97 
 (0.69)  (0.74)  (0.82)  (0.77)  (0.94)  (1.05) 
Observations  830 834 838 1435 1445 1453 
N_clust 45  45  45  76  75  75 
Observations with Y=1  24 22 19  40  37  34 
Observations with Y=1(%)  2,89% 2,64% 2,27%  2,79%  2,56%  2,34% 
χ2 statistic for βt+βt’=0  7.14*** 9.29***  3.16*  17.85*** 14.90*** 10.93*** 
χ2 statistic for βt’=0 and αt’=0  7.03** 14.34*** 11.67*** 11.25***  9.99***  7.56** 
chi2 36.6  38.2  26.3  96.9  102  124 
r2_p 0.29  0.27  0.28  0.35  0.38  0.38 
Model Specification :  {} ( ) t t t t t t t t camer γ du20c1r ' α dddu20c1r ' ddr α 1 Prob + + + + Φ = = β β i Y   
where rt (t= 1, …, 8) indicates the number of lags in quarter and dddu10c1rt = ddrt×du10c1rt 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Ownership concentration and market discipline in European banking 
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Table 8 
  (1) (2) (3)  (1’)  (2’)  (3’) 
COEFFICIENT fragile2_c  fragile2_c fragile2_c fragile2_cd fragile2_cd fragile2_cd 
           
ddr2 -0.18      -0.28**     
 (0.17)      (0.14)     
ddduminorityblockpremier10r2 -0.53      -0.33     
 (0.37)      (0.25)     
duminorityblockpremier10r2 1.05      1.31     
 (1.21)      (1.00)     
camer2 -0.53***      -0.55***     
 (0.15)      (0.08)     
ddr3    -0.23     -0.30*  
   (0.18)      (0.18)   
ddduminorityblockpremier10r3   -0.17      -0.35   
   (0.29)      (0.30)   
duminorityblockpremier10r3   0.19      1.36   
   (1.16)      (1.15)   
camer3   -0.52***     -0.59***   
   (0.17)      (0.09)   
ddr4     -0.24      -0.28 
     (0.20)      (0.21) 
ddduminorityblockpremier10r4     0.17      -0.27 
     (0.29)      (0.27) 
duminorityblockpremier10r4     -0.57      1.19 
     (1.54)      (1.17) 
camer4     -0.58***      -0.63*** 
     (0.18)      (0.10) 
Constant  -0.16 -0.13 -0.18  -0.20  -0.08  -0.14 
  (0.77) (0.89) (1.08)  (0.78)  (0.87)  (0.94) 
Observations  830 834 838 1435  1445  1453 
N_clust  45 45 45  76  75  75 
Observations with Y=1  24  22  19  40  37  34 
Observations with Y=1 (%)  2,89%  2,64%  2,27%  2,79% 2,56% 2,34% 
χ2 statistic for βt+βt’=0  3.58* 2.13  0.11 7.03***  6.34**  9.53*** 
χ2 statistic for βt’=0 and αt’=0  2.31 0.50 0.34  1.94  1.51  1.12 
chi2  30.7 30.4 27.1  63.8  56.1  63.3 
r2_p  0.28 0.26 0.26  0.28  0.30  0.31 
Model Specification :  {} ( ) t t t t t t t t camer γ r10r blokpremie duminority ' α ier10r tyblokprem ddduminori ' ddr α 1 Prob + + + + Φ = = β β i Y   
where rt (t= 1, …, 8) indicates the number of lags in quarter and ddduminorityblockpremier10rt = ddrt×duminorityblockpremier10rt 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B
12 : Merton's structural model of credit risk 
(1974) 
We follow Merton's approach ("On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates", 1974) by using 
an option-based structural model of credit risk. In this framework, the firm goes bankruptcy whenever the value of its assets 
falls below the face value of its debt at maturity. A measure of the creditworthiness of the firms is then given by the distance-
to-default indicator, which represents the number of standard deviations (measured in terms of the assets' volatility) that 
separate the firm from its default point (defined by Total Assets = Total Debt). The smaller the distance-to-default, the higher 
the default risk. 
However, the value of the firm's assets, as well as their volatility, are not observable. Since we have access to the price of 
equity, we can use the option-pricing formula derived by Black and Scholes (1973) to calculate these unknown values. 
Indeed, Merton (1974) shows that a firm’s equity value is equivalent to an European call option on the asset value of the firm 

















As usual, we assume that the asset value of the firm, VA, follows a Geometric Brownian Motion with drift equal to the 
risk-free rate, r, and volatility σA . The value of equity as an option on the firm's assets, as well as its volatility, are given by 
two formulae derived from the standard option pricing approach and depends on VA, σA, r, D and T, the time to maturity. 
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Where N(d) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribution and N(d2) represents the 












=    and   d2 = d1- σA √T 
Reverse-engineering of these two equations yields the asset value and the asset volatility. Finally, the distance-to-default 
is given by : 
A
A D V DD
σ
− =  
To compute the distance-to-default indicator on a monthly basis, we need the following inputs: the total market 
capitalization, the level and maturity of the debt, the volatility of stock prices. 
The market capitalization (€m) is extracted from Datastream. The definition of the debt we use is the KMV standard 
given by the sum of the short-term debt and the half of the long-term debt. Finally, the historical volatility of the stock at the 
date t is defined as the moving average of the daily returns on the stock. The only parameter of choice is the width of the 
moving average window, traditionally ranging from 1 to 12 months. We have tested several width of this window because 
they influence the evolution of the volatility and the DD (see Brossard, Ducrozet & Roche, 2007). We also tried alternative 
specifications of the debt (Total Debt, interpolated or not), but this had no significant effect on the values of the DD. 
                                                 
12 This Appendix has been redacted by F. Ducrozet and A. Roche (See Brossard, Ducrozet and Roche 2007). 
13 The risk neutral framework simplifies calculations since we do not need to estimate the drift of the asset value. 
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We finally chose to set the window width to 6 months, as Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005) did, because this is a good 
compromise between volatility smoothing and reactivity of the final DD indicator. We do not interpolate the value of the debt 
because it would imply the use of future information (the future value of the debt) as an input to predict current rating 
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